Showing posts with label money. Show all posts
Showing posts with label money. Show all posts

Sunday, October 14, 2012

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE? Hmmm


Have You Been Granted Social Security Benefits But Also Ordered To Designate A Payee Representative?

 
 
 
 

The Way I C It, you should appeal if you believe you have your head on straight and can back it up. 

If you Disagree with Social Security Administration’s Decision:

 

You have the right to appeal either the decision that you need a representative payee, or the person or organization SSA has chosen as your representative payee. You have 60 days to appeal a decision by contacting SSA. Contact your local Social Security office

 

Remove the representative payee from an account. If someone needs to be removed from a bank account as representative payee because you can now manage your own money, you must provide proof by visiting a Social Security office. If your mental or physical capacity has improved you must take a letter from your doctor to the Social Security Administration office to confirm this. Other proof can consist of a court order. In addition to the letter, bring picture identification such as a driver's license or state identification and your Social Security card.

Fill out the application provided by Social Security. You will be required to fill out a brief application and the SSA must approve the change. If approved go to your bank and open a new account. Your bank will need a letter from Social Security which confirms you are now the representative payee. Provide Social Security with the new bank account number and routing number. All future deposits will go to the new account. The old representative payee will be informed by mail. They will be required to turn over all remaining funds to Social Security or you.


 


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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

TITLE 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER III--ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

PART 305--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES


1 C.F.R. s 305.91-3


s 305.91-3 The Social Security Representative Payee Program (Recommendation No. 91-3).


As part of the Social Security program, Congress has authorized the Social Security Administration (SSA) to pay certain beneficiaries' benefits to other persons or organizations where the Secretary determines that payment to such a "representative payee" would be in the interest of the beneficiary. [FN1] SSA currently pays about $20 billion annually in social security benefits to representative payees of more than 4 million (or about 10%) beneficiaries. Because the program has been the subject of some concern and litigation, SSA asked the Administrative Conference of the United States to study certain procedural aspects of the representative payee program. While the study was underway, Congress addressed some of the procedural issues as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA), Public Law 101-508, section 5015.


[FN1] The term "beneficiary" as used in this recommendation refers to those receiving benefits under both title II (old age survivors and disability benefits) and title XVI (supplemental security income payments). Those receiving benefits under this latter program are technically referred to as "recipients."


A. Rulemaking. The representative payee program operates under a statute that for the most part paints program requirements with a broad brush. SSA has some regulations, but many of the operating instructions are found in the Program Operating Manual System (POMS), the agency's internal operating manual. There are a number of issues the Conference believes should be the subject of regulations, either because they are not adequately addressed anywhere, or because they should be addressed in regulations rather than only in the POMS. These issues are discussed below. This recommendation contains specific suggestions for modifying the procedures for appointing representative payees (see section B, below). For a number of other issues, involving the establishment of program criteria, the Conference takes no position on the content of the rules, but recommends that the issues be addressed in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking.


First, there currently exists no clear standard for when a representative payee should be appointed in a particular case. The Social Security Act provides that "(i)f the Secretary determines that the interest of any individual under this title would be served thereby, certification of payment of such individual's benefit under this title may be made * * * (to a representative payee)." [FN2] The Act does not contain any standard for determining when appointment of a representative payee is in the beneficiary's interest. Current SSA regulations provide only that a representative payee will be appointed when "due to a mental or physical condition or due to * * * youth," a beneficiary is "not able to manage or direct the management of" his or her own benefits. [FN3] The regulations neither indicate what constitutes an inability to manage benefits, nor what mental or physical condition must be found. This lack of a standard requires SSA personnel to make largely discretionary decisions that are difficult to challenge individually or to evaluate programmatically.


[FN2] 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(1) (Title II). For title XVI, the provisions are comparable. See 42 U.S.C. 1383(a)(2)(A).


[FN3] 20 CFR 404.2001, 416.601 (1990).


While the Administrative Conference takes no position on what the substance of a standard for representative payee appointment should be, it believes that the promulgation of a more detailed standard through rulemaking is important to promote the appearance and reality of fairness and consistency in operation of the representative payee program. [FN4]

[FN4] Among the issues that might be addressed are how the specific standard should balance interests in beneficiary autonomy versus government beneficence, what factors should be considered in determining whether a beneficiary's interest would be served by appointing a payee, what should constitute inability to manage benefits, and who should be the decisionmaker (e.g., the states in guardianship proceedings, the state disability determination services, or trained agency lay or medical staff). Any rule setting a standard for appointing a representative payee should also address the question of what types of evidence are either appropriate or necessary in making the determination.


SSA should also itself carefully consider the education levels and other qualifications of agency officials making determinations on representative payee status, to ensure that such decisionmakers have the necessary skills to apply whatever standard is developed.


Second, concerns have been raised that persons interested in gaining access to beneficiary funds may provoke SSA action to appoint a representative payee without sufficient factual basis. Thus, a standard should be developed for a minimum amount of evidence necessary to trigger the initiation of procedures that could result in the appointment of a representative payee.


Third, the Conference recommends that SSA promulgate clarifying rules relating to eligibility to serve as a representative payee, including a method for determining priorities where there are competing applicants for such payee status. Although SSA has some internal guidelines for selecting appropriate representative payees, the Conference believes that such issues should be addressed in regulations, to provide public participation in their development and to provide easier access to their contents.


Finally, the question of SSA's responsibility to monitor representative payee performance has been a subject of concern. Although a court has ruled that the Constitution's due process clause requires annual accounting by all representative payees, [FN5] the decision's continued applicability is not clear. [FN6] The Social Security Act currently requires annual accounting by representative payees, except certain institutions. [FN7] Congress in the OBRA amendments expressly required SSA to study more stringent monitoring of "high risk" payees (e.g., representative payees who are not related to the beneficiary or who are creditors). SSA should undertake rulemaking to promulgate procedures for monitoring representative payee performance in a manner that will be both effective and efficient. [FN8]


[FN5] Jordan v. Schweiker, 744 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir.1984); Jordan v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 733 (10th Cir.1987).


[FN6] The Jordan case was a class action, certified in 1980. The court held that the Constitution required annual accounting for all payees. The impact of time on the class, as well as the impact of subsequent legislation, raises some questions concerning the case's current applicability.


[FN7] 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(3).


[FN8] Such a rulemaking could address such issues as what type of information is needed to make decisions, how often it should be reported or collected, whether different requirements should apply to different types of payees, and what SSA will do with the information it obtains in terms of its internal use and public availability.


B. Procedures--1. Current procedures. When SSA receives information that a particular beneficiary may need a representative payee, it seeks to gather evidence with which to determine whether the beneficiary is incapable of managing his or her own benefits. [FN9] If SSA decides that the beneficiary is incapable, its first step is to select a representative payee. SSA then sends what is called an "advance notice" to the beneficiary, informing the beneficiary that he or she has been found incapable of managing benefits and that SSA intends to appoint the named representative payee. The beneficiary is allowed 10 days to respond to SSA and provide additional facts. This is often the first notice that the beneficiary receives that appointment of a representative payee is being contemplated. If, after receiving any further information, SSA confirms its decision, it sends the beneficiary notice of its "initial decision," which is implemented immediately. The beneficiary may seek "reconsideration" from SSA, following which the beneficiary is entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge and appeal to the Appeals Council.


[FN9] Such evidence may include state adjudications of incompetence, a physician's opinion that a beneficiary is unable to manage benefits, or lay evidence to that effect.


Under these current procedures, the beneficiary generally is provided no notice that SSA is considering appointing a representative payee until the agency has already preliminary decided that one is necessary and has selected a candidate. The "advance notice" does not explain the basis for the decision to appoint a representative payee. Nor is the beneficiary given an opportunity to meet with SSA face-to-face before a representative payee decision is implemented. While the present procedures appear to satisfy constitutional minima, considerations of efficiency, fairness and appearance of fairness suggest certain modifications to these procedures.


2. Conference recommendations. The Conference recommends several changes in the process, that, consistent with its other recommendations involving the Social Security program, encourage increased procedural safeguards at the beginning of the process in order to maximize correct decisions in the early stages and lessen the need for additional proceedings. [FN10] The Conference recommends that SSA notify a beneficiary as soon as the threshold for initiating action, discussed above, is met, offering the beneficiary an opportunity to have an informal face-to-face interview with an SSA claims representative. To the extent practicable, the notice (and all other notices) should be designed to be understandable to the beneficiary, taking into consideration information already in the file (e.g., what language the beneficiary understands). [FN11] The notice should also inform the beneficiary that appointment of a representative payee is being considered, describe the standard for and basic reason(s) why it is being considered, ask for all relevant information concerning the need for and selection of a representative payee, and ask the beneficiary to suggest a possible candidate. SSA should also notify the beneficiary of any person(s) it knows to be under consideration as a representative payee.


[FN10] See, e.g., Recommendation No. 90-4, "The Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation," 1 CFR 305.90-4.


[FN11] The expectation is that there would be several form notices with the clearest practicable wording in different languages, normal and large type sizes, and perhaps braille.


If, after completing its investigation, SSA decides to appoint a representative payee, it should notify the beneficiary of this determination, informing him or her of the right to review the evidence and appeal. [FN12] The determination then would be implemented, after which appeal to an ALJ and the Appeals Council would be available, as it is now. These procedures would eliminate the current opportunity for "reconsideration" that is provided after implementation but before the ALJ hearing.


[FN12] OBRA amendments require such notice. See 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(2)(E); 1631(a)(2)(B)(x)-(xii).


The rationale for these recommended procedures is that a beneficiary should have notice and the opportunity to respond concerning his or her alleged inability to manage benefits before the SSA has made a de facto determination that a representative payee is required and who that payee should be. The ability to manage benefits is not always strictly a medical determination; it may well involve consideration of observed behavior. Thus, it is likely that a decisionmaker who has had an opportunity to see and talk with the beneficiary will often make a more accurate determination of the need for a representative payee. [FN13] The Conference believes that, as in the disability adjudication itself, procedures that encourage as complete a record as early in the process as possible offer significant advantages that far outweigh any short-term costs occasioned by adding an earlier notice and opportunity for a face-to-face meeting. Not only will early notice to beneficiaries and an opportunity for personal contact with SSA allow beneficiaries to provide any relevant information that they have at a predecisional level, it may also give them more confidence in the process, thus resulting in fewer appeals at later stages. Moreover, as noted above, the opportunity for "reconsideration" that is currently provided after implementation but before the ALJ hearing would no longer be required.


[FN13] The Administrative Conference has recommended that face-to-face meetings be available in the context of medical disability determinations. Recommendation 89-10, "Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability Determinations," 1 CFR 305.89-10.


Under current procedures, beneficiaries are permitted to have assistance, by attorneys or non-attorneys, in disputes over representative payee status. However, because of the lack of formal procedures until late in the process and, more important, the lack of an "award" out of which to pay attorneys, there has been little attorney or lay assistance involvement in this program. It would thus be especially useful for SSA to develop and provide beneficiaries with information about legal assistance and other relevant organizations that may be available in their areas. [FN14]


[FN14] The Conference has encouraged the use of nonlawyers in agency proceedings. See Recommendation 86-1, "Nonlawyer Assistance and Representation," 1 CFR 305.86-1.


In situations where someone applies to replace a representative payee, both the payee and the beneficiary should be given notice of the possible replacement. Both should be given an opportunity to file comments and to meet informally with SSA officials. If the representative payee is replaced, the beneficiary (but not the payee) should have the right to appeal the determination.


Although a beneficiary in representative payee status may apply to have such status terminated, no procedure currently exists for reexamining the need for a representative payee on any periodic basis. Because there are certain types of beneficiaries for whom a representative payee is less likely to be needed permanently (e.g., stroke victims, persons with reactive depression), it is in the interests of both the agency and beneficiaries to reassess periodically the need for representative payees for such individuals. Thus, the Conference recommends that SSA attempt to determine which, if any, types of beneficiaries in representative payee status ought to have their status periodically reevaluated and provide a method for doing so.


C. Misuse of funds and restitution--1. Current practice. Currently, determinations by SSA that beneficiary funds have been misused are not appealable. This means that neither the beneficiary nor the representative payee may challenge such determinations. Moreover, SSA does not currently have an effective mechanism for requiring payees who misuse beneficiary funds to return such funds to beneficiaries. [FN15] SSA currently has only the options of referring cases to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution or requesting the representative payee to return funds. Most cases are too small to warrant Justice Department action, and SSA has no authority to force a representative payee to pay restitution.


[FN15] In cases where SSA has been negligent in investigating or monitoring representative payees, SSA must make restitution to the beneficiary. OBRA 5105(c).


2. Conference recommendations. Beneficiaries should be permitted to appeal an administrative determination that their benefits have not been used properly. [FN16] Representative payees should also be permitted to appeal misuse determinations. Although they have no right to payee status, a determination that they have misused funds will be entered into a data bank, will prevent them from being appointed as a representative payee in the future, and may have other negative ramifications. These consequences suggest that more process may be due. ACUS recommends that a determination of whether representative payee misuse of beneficiary funds has occurred be considered an "initial determination," which triggers the right to reconsideration and, if necessary, a subsequent ALJ hearing.


[FN16] Beneficiaries do have the right to use state court remedies.


The Administrative Conference also recommends that Congress authorize an administrative remedy that would allow SSA to (1) require representative payees who have misused beneficiary funds to pay restitution, and (2) impose civil monetary penalties on such payees. Such authority would enable SSA to address the problem without burdening the courts. [FN17]


[FN17] See Recommendation 72-6, "Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction," 1 CFR 305.72-6; Recommendation 79-3, "Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties," 1 CFR 305.79-3. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 31 U.S.C. 3801, authorizes the imposition of administrative civil penalties for false claims against the government and for certain types of false statements. However, it is not clear whether this Act would apply to representative payee actions, and in any event, it does not provide a remedy of restitution.


The OBRA amendments made clear that, where SSA's negligent failure to investigate or monitor a representative payee results in misuse of benefits, SSA must make restitution to the beneficiary for any such benefits, and then may seek repayment from the payee. [FN18] The negative impact on a beneficiary caused by misuse of his or her benefits, however, is independent of whether any SSA negligence was involved. Congress should authorize research on the scope, causes and effects of representative payee misuse of benefits, and methods to ease the resulting burden on beneficiaries, including the use of loss underwriting arrangements.


[FN18] OBRA 5105(c)(1), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(5).


D. Other issues. When this study was undertaken, the issue of SSA's need to investigate representative payees before their appointment was of major concern. The recent OBRA amendments, however, require SSA to undertake certain investigations of potential representative payees. For the present, those steps would appear to be adequate, but, after sufficient time has passed, their effectiveness should be reevaluated.


In the past, where SSA has determined that a representative payee is required, but has not found a suitable candidate, SSA has suspended benefit payments until a payee could be found, at which time the withheld payments would be released to that payee. In the OBRA amendments, Congress authorized SSA to suspend payments for no more than 30 days, where direct payment would substantially harm the beneficiary. However, where the beneficiary is legally incompetent, under the age of 15, or a drug addict or alcoholic, there is no time limit on the suspension of benefits. The Conference believes that SSA should study the impacts of the indefinite suspension of benefits on beneficiaries in these groups, with the objective of making legislative recommendations to Congress if the study suggests that time limits should exist for all classes of beneficiaries or that suspension should not permitted at all.


In many cases, finding an appropriate representative payee is a significant problem. SSA should take steps to ease its burden by widening the pool of potential representative payees, and by periodically seeking input from beneficiaries. It would be useful for SSA to ask beneficiaries, at the time that they apply for benefits and periodically thereafter, to designate a person whom, at that time, they would prefer to serve as a representative payee, should one become necessary. While such a designation would not bind the agency, in many cases, the designation of someone whom the beneficiary thought was appropriate could make the selection process easier for SSA and make the beneficiary more comfortable with the representative payee. SSA also should develop lists of national, regional and local organizations that could serve as representative payees on a volunteer basis, and evaluate carefully the performance of these and compensated or reimbursed representative payees. [FN19]


[FN19] Congress has authorized the use of reimbursed representative payees on a very limited basis. OBRA of 1990, Pub.L. 101-508, sec. 5105(a)(3).

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

VATICAN INVLOVED IN MURDER AND MAFIA?






IT HAS LONG BEEN BELIEVED THAT THE ANTI-CHRIST WOULD STEM FROM THE VATICAN.

 


The Way I C It, Hollywood makes another million on a truth based Godfather movie (Godfather 3) and, we the people are brainwashed into believing that the Smiling Pope died of natural causes; not because of the movie but because the media down plays such matters.  
Like 9-11 we are told the lie and chose to believe it.  The Godfather 3 was actually telling us the truth of a corrupt Vatican, and an honest Pope who was going to clean it up but he was murdered while only in papacy for 33 days.




This is not the first Vatican  Scandal but the one which first drew media attention





In the early 1980's, the Vatican Bank scandal erupted in Italy, bringing to light corruption of unprecedented proportions within the Catholic Church's hierarchy.



The scandal was covered on a daily basis by the Italian press, but very little was ever mentioned in America, as a veil of silence, still existing today, protects Vatican corruption from ever getting into the mainstream and even the alternative American press.




In fact, the bank scandal which brought down the Bank of Ambrosiano in Rome, leading to the execution-style murder of the bank's president, Roberto Calvi, came on the heels of the assassination of Pope John Paul I. The Pope was killed several years prior to the scandal for wanting to clean up the Vatican Bank as well as expose the Masonic involvement of many high-level bishops and cardinals.




Although the Pope's death was officially listed as being "from natural causes," he strangely died after serving only 33 days in office an important Illuminati cult number ­ and was never given a proper independent autopsy or murder investigation




In fact, when family members and friends asked to have the Pope's intestines properly examined to check for possible poisons, the late Under-Secretary to the Pope, Cardinal Jean-Marie Villot, suspected of being at the heart of the Pope's assassination, officially released a statement that "the Pope's intestines unfortunately had already been burned."
With John Paul I out of the way, the corruption in the Church continued as usual with Archbishop Paul Marcinkus of Chicago, head of the Vatican Bank, given a clean slate and protection from Pope John Paul II.




Further, researchers surmise Calvi was killed - found hanging with heavy bricks tied to his body -- because he was preparing to spill the beans on top-level Vatican and Italian government officials. These included Marcinkus, members of the Jesuits, P2 Masonic Lodge head Licio Gelli, and members of the U.S. government and intelligence community, all working hand-in-glove to defraud the Italian people and the European banking community.



 

Sindona and Licio Gelli










Researchers who cover the Vatican closely surmise the reason why is that the Vatican, through the many Zionist media owners it uses as a cover, is bought and paid off to keep the Vatican and their Jesuit Order henchmen quietly in the background, out of sight and out of mind.









.




 

However, for those caught in the Jesuit trap of silence and for those who never heard of the Vatican Bank scandal, it brought to light Vatican involvement in money laundering with the Mafia. Corruption embedded in the Italian P2 Masonic Lodges was also revealed when several Italian and French publications disclosed how more than 150 high-level Catholic priests, bishops, and cardinals were practicing members of Freemasonry, many of whom were tagged as being Satanists.






BEHIND THE SCENES










DISPUTED, YET THIS REMAINS IN WIKIPEDIA:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_sex_abuse_cases








The Catholic sex abuse cases are a series of convictions, trials and ongoing investigations into allegations of sex crimes committed by Catholic priests and active members of Roman Catholic orders against children as young as 3 years old with the majority between the ages of 10 and 16.[1] These cases included sodomy, and oral penetration and began receiving public attention beginning in the mid-1980s with new cases still being brought forward with the first reported cases in the 1950's.[2] There have been criminal prosecutions of the abusers and civil lawsuits against the church's dioceses and parishes.


SEX WITH CHILDREN UNDER 3 YEARS IS OK







CATHOLIC JESUITS AND THE VATICAN












BISHOP WILLIAMSON SPEAKS OUT AGAINST FREE MASONRY IN THE CHURCH

 

 








In several stories located in the Arctic Beacon archives, this publication has previously listed the names of the priests tagged with Masonic membership, along with their code names. It also should be mentioned that according to Canon Law, affiliation with Freemasonry results in immediate excommunication from the Catholic Church, something that never happened to any of the 150 or more priests mentioned by the European source of the information.










DID ROBERTO CALVI COMMIT SUICIDE?

 

 













 

94 MINUTES OF NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC CHANNEL MASONINC TRIAL

 

 












Why the "Banker of God" Had to be Made Silent
Mysterious case of death obscures the secret
surrounding the death of Pope John Paul I
The death of Pope John Paul I on the 28th September, 1978, after only 33 days in office, shook the whole world. Until now, the detailed circumstances of the death of this gracious, ever smiling, Holy Father have not yet been revealed.
One of the men who would have been able to testify, died recently - on a tenth of a gram of cyanide.


 

Pop John Paul I (The Smiling Pope)









Michele Sidona




 

Poison Coffee






Michele Sindona (66), the most important economist and banking expert of the 70's in Italy, died in the high security Voghera prison in Italy - after eating his dinner.
After the collapse of Sindona's 'Banca Privata Unione' in Milan and the 'Franklin National Bank' in New York, the financier was arrested in America and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. Even though he strongly contested it, Sindona was extradited to Italy. "I am not going to survive there for long," he said. "It was murder," his lawyers now claim.
In their opinion, suicide was ruled out.
Yet, Michele Sindona had top class contacts. Not only was the Mafia and the illegal secret lodge P2 under his influence, but Sindona also made big business with the Vatican. His friendship with Bishop Paul Marcinkus, who controls the considerable finances of the Vatican, was a thorn in the side of Pope John Paul I. The Pope had emphasised several times that the profiteering of the Vatican bank was not according to the will of Christ, and that the money belonged to the whole church. After the Pope's mysterious death, the rumours that the high banking circles like the Mafia or P2 had had a hand in the affair, increased and are still circulating. Michele Sindona belonged to this inner circle.
After being sentenced to life, Sindona prepared for his appeal in which he finally wanted to disclose everything. This would have been disastrous for 500 international personalities - for those who made quite a profit from Michele Sindona's banking exploits.
 


DEATH OF POPE JOHN PAUL I (The Smiling Pope)

Jesus was said to have been 33 years old at the time of His death

 

 

 










Archbishop Marcinkus






Archbishop Marcinkus was already under the wing of the Jesuits, and had been previously tagged as a CIA/ Nazi spy working underground in Poland to sell out his people, along with liberal priests who were sent to concentration camps and killed.


Furthermore, it must be noted that Archbishop Marcinkus, who died when he was 84 in Phoenix, Arizona, was at the heart of the bank scandal, having been indicted by Italian authorities for fraud as well as being suspected of having a hand in the murder of Calvi, found hanging by the neck under the Black Friars Bridge in London.


Although Calvi's death was classified as a suicide, a proper investigation was never conducted. Family members still pursuing justice claim he was murdered by the Vatican-led Illuminati, who feared Calvi was not going to go away quietly and take the fall for his bank's demise alone.
Looking back, the story was big Illuminati news back then in Italy, with Archbishop Marcinkus indicted and at the center of both the scandal and the Calvi murder. However, with bribery being an important part of the Vatican arsenal, Marcinkus' case was never brought to trial, as he Vatican paid more than $250,000 to the Italian government to have the case dropped.
Meanwhile Marcinkus, under the cover of night, was given diplomatic immunity by the Vatican and U.S. government, quietly being shipped away to a Catholic Parish in Phoenix where his activities were limited to saying Mass and the Rosary.

Although Marcinkus was far away from the Rome scandal, the story and Calvi's murder always haunted him until his death last year. Italian prosecutors, as well as this journalist, were hot on his trail, trying to secure an interview just prior to his death.
As for the Rome prosecutors, they recently re-opened the Calvi case, bringing several Mafia members to trial last year for their alleged involvement, as well as trying to secure testimony from Marcinkus, vital testimony being blocked by his Illuminati handlers.
As for this reporter, never allowed to interview Marcinkus in the early 80's by order of the Vatican, it was this publication's intention, better late than never, to go to Phoenix to meet with Marcinkus. A dialogue to secure the interview was being conducted with a family member only 10 days before Marcinkus was found dead at the age of 81 of an apparent heart attack in his room at the Phoenix Parish.

During the dialogue with the close family member, who insisted on Marcinkus' innocence, this reporter said he would give the Archbishop the benefit of the doubt, promising to ask questions about who then were the real culprits and promising never to release Marcinkus' video-taped testimony until the Archbishop passed on.

Leaving the conversation 10 days before his death at the point where the family member stated Marcinkus was aware of the Arctic Beacon web site and this reporter's stories, this reporter was told Marcinkus would be asked, despite his frail health, if he would consent to the interview.

Unfortunately, shortly thereafter it was reported in the Associated Press, local Phoenix papers, and the Catholic press that Marcinkus had suddenly died of natural causes due to a heart attack, passing away quietly in his sleep.

When the family member was later asked if anything suspicious was found regarding the Archbishop's death due to the interview requests by both the Rome prosecutors and this reporter, the family member denied anything suspicious, saying he only knew what was being reported by the Church, which was that Marcinkus had died of a heart attack.
With Marcinkus now gone, researchers and this reporter surmised the Jesuits were most likely pulling Marcinkus' strings since they control Freemasonry with the only names logical to pursue being the Jesuit General himself, Fr. Peter Hans Kolvenbach and one of his trusted henchmen, Jesuit Bishop Pavel Hnilica.


 

Pope Benedict with Fr. Peter Hans Kolvenbach







Jesuit Bishop Pavel Hnilica








Even the KKK can thank Roman Catholic symbolism for their hooded robes of old. 

Notice the Roman Catholic priests “dressed to kill” in a Vatican ceremony below








Of course, the Jesuit General refused a formal interview request by this publication, saying he was too busy spreading the word of God to be bothered with such trivia and trivial publications. And, with regard to Hnilica, it was recently reported by a Slovakian TV station that he recently passed away from natural causes.


With this reporter out of leads, a stroke of journalistic luck or perhaps the hand of God recently intervened when Leo Zagami, a former 33-degree Freemason from the Monte Carlo P2 Lodge, came forward with vital information which could lead to what, in fact, Marcinkus really knew, whether he was killed or died naturally, and the identity of the real Vatican-Jesuit culprits behind the bank scandal and behind the Illuminati-Freemason connection.



Leo Zagami knows his life is in danger, but Illuminati insider who broke away from Satanism wants to warn Americans about the "evil enemy" destroying freedom. -
- by Greg Szymanski, Oct 18, 2006 -
(From: Wednesday, October 18, 2006


http://www.illuminati-news.com/101806a.htm





"Marcinkus was a member of my P2 Monte Carlo Lodge. I know that for a fact," said Zagami this week from his home in Norway, after breaking loose form the Illuminati and leaving his home country of Italy, fearing for his life.



"At the moment the majority pack of Barclays Bank is obviously in the hands of poor old Queen of England, who seems to sell out completely to the American Illuminati and their vicious games with Daddy Rockefeller and the P2.

"All major U.S. Banks have ties with the P2 but he has a special deal with Brother Ezio Giunchiglia and the Vatican . The only person allowed to have direct contact with Marcinkus at all times until his recent death was and always has been Ezio Giunchiglia of the Monte Carlo Board of Directors, the best friend of the Jesuits. Contact Ezio. He should know everything."



Ezio Giunchiglia










Ezio Giunchiglia & Leo Lyon Zagami at Ezio’s house in Monte Carlo




For a more detailed look at the new Calvi murder trial opened up in Rome in 2005, here is a report from last year by Conrad F. Goeringer, reprinted in part:
Among those linked to Calvi was Archbishop Paul Marcinkus. Ordained in Chicago, Marcinkus was posted to the Holy See in Rome, and served in the Vatican Secretariat of State.


Among those on trial in the murder of Roberto Calvi is gangster Flavio Carboni, considered a "fixer" with ties to police, political groups, intelligence services and the Vatican. Banco Ambrosiano backed a risky construction project Carboni had launched in Sardinia. He also admitted being with Gelli in London with Calvi after the embattled banker had fled in the wake of the Ambrosiano collapse. Skeptics say thatCarboni was a close friend of Calvi's and had no credible motive for carrying out the murder.


He rapidly moved up within Vatican bureaucracy from personal papal bodyguard to head of the IOR -- a post he held from 1971 to 1989. There he worked closely with international financier Michael Sindona to expand the Vatican's portfolio of international holdings, transforming the Institute for Religious Works into a quiet but reliable shelter for questionable capital. Sindona, laundering money from associates in organized crime, funneled huge sums of money through Banco Ambrosiano and the IOR. The Vatican Bank also worked closely with the United States government as a cover money conduit to groups like the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland. Thanks to Marcinkus, Sindona was to become a "man of confidence" within the Vatican who enjoyed unique access to officials of the Holy See, even the pope.


Michael Sindona had been among Calvi's patrons at the Banco Ambrosiano, and helped expand the small "Catholic bank" into an international financial institution. Sindona's financial manipulations make a story of their own, and investigations after the Ambrosiano collapse would document how his elaborate international network of banks and offshore companies served as vehicle for laundering dirty money earned from everything from heroin traffic to "soft money" investments.

Perhaps the most mysterious character in the Calvi saga was Liccio Gelli. A former member of the fascist Black Shirts Battalion and liaison between the Mussolini regime and the infamous Herman Goring SS Division in World War II, Gelli survived the conflict and amassed an impressive list of contacts. He also obtained sensitive information on hundreds of key political, military and financial figures not only in Italy but throughout Europe, Latin America and elsewhere thanks to his access of files from the Italian secret service (OVRA) and possibly British Intelligence. Gelli helped to smuggle Klaus Barbie, the infamous "Butcher of Lyon" to safe haven in Argentina, and even managed to sell his services to the CIA and NATO. He also ingratiated himself with the regime of Juan Person in Argentina.


In 1963, Gelli began the takeover an obscure Italian Masonic lodge, Propaganda Due or P-2, and using the blackmail files of the OVRA and other information, began aggressively recruiting members of the military and intelligence services, as well as key financial and political figures. (The Grand Lodge of Italy quickly severed recognition ties with P-2 when it learned of Gelli's activities.) P-2 expanded its operations to Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, France, Portugal and Nicaragua. Associated of Klaus Barbie were recruited, as were leaders from death squads operating in Latin America. One member was the notorious Jose Lopez Gega, an Argentinean clerical fascist who also ran a cocaine smuggling operation into the United States.


Gelli, like Sindona, enjoyed unprecedented access to the Vatican thanks to his close friendship with Cardinal Paolo Bertoli of the Holy See's Diplomatic Corps. Bertoli is known to have introduced Gelli to Paul Marcinkus. Another close associate and member of this "Gang of Four" was Umberrto Ortolani, a former OVRA Intelligence Officer and co-patron for Calvi while he was moving up in the Banco Ambrosiano. Ortolani was also tied to a secretive Roman Catholic order known as the Knights of Malta, and was elevated by Pope Paul VI to the status of "Gentleman of his Holiness." He also sponsored Liccio Gelli for membership in the Knights of Malta.


As the scandal enveloping Calvi and the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano unfolded, police raided Gelli's private offices on March 17, 1981 and seized a treasure trove of documents including one of the membership lists of P-2. Among the 962 members identified in the papers were 43 generals in the Italian armed forces, eight admirals, 43 members of Parliament, all of the heads of the respective security and intelligence services, editors and publishers of major Italian papers and, of course, Michael Sindona and Roberto Calvi. Word of several other lists eventually surfaced, and one P-2 member "went public" with charges that key functionaries of the Holy See were involved in the clandestine group. The cell was shut down by prosecutors amidst evidence that Gelli and P-2 were establishing a "state within a state," and were plotting what amounted to a fascist coup. He eluded police for years, was captured in Cannes, then escaped prison and then died.

After being sentenced to life, Sindona prepared for his appeal in which he finally wanted to disclose everything. This would have been disastrous for 500 international personalities - for those who made quite a profit from Michele Sindona's banking exploits. He was sentenced to life in prison and his unexpected death would arrive in a harmless china cup of coffee offered - but unknown to him - heavily laced with deadly cyanide within the walls of a Milan prison.

When his new congregation in Arizona were asked about his dubious business dealings, they all refused to believe it and went on to tell the reporter how wonderful and happy they were with their ailing Pastor. They saw him as a faithful smiling cigar-smoking priest from far away Chicago who enjoyed a regular game of golf around his Sun City gated retirement community in the Phoenix Archdiocese. Maybe even some of their sons happily caddied for him.


Sun City, Arizona, has a modest population of just 40,000 people.
This former heavy weight of Rome (once called the guerrilla) lived comfortably in his $400,000 bungalow, with outdoor swimming pool (owned by the diocese of Chicago), and played golf in their exclusive and private lawns, while still enjoying Vatican diplomatic immunity; he was known by his American parishioners, as "Fr." Chink. Before his death on the 20th February 2006.
A Vatican "offical" made a trip to see him, and was able to collate some of his "papers," before returning back to Rome.


Yet during this period in his office in Rome at the Institute of Religious Works (IRS), he quickly earned the sobriquet of "God's Banker" which of course he wasn't, but I'm sure he enjoyed being called it all the same. And into this shady religious world such names as Calvi, Sindona, Paul VI and John Paul II, would be named for the first time in the press and even some, criminally indicted, as financial rascals.
The death in Phoenix, Arizona of Archbishop Paul Marcinkus aged 84, brought to a final close (well almost) of a disgraceful period in the history of the Roman Catholic Church.

A MURDER PLOT REVEALED?
Beginning in 1998, the Calvi affair was back in the news when the family of the late financier had his body exhumed. The new autopsy confirmed that Calvi was murdered elsewhere, and his corpse then hanged from beneath Blackfriar's Bridge. Investigators caught a major break in the case when in December, 2002, Mafia kingpin Antonio Giuffee told police that Calvi was murdered in part for absconding with mob money being laundered through Banco Ambrosiano.

It is known that as the bank collapsed, Calvi approached friends in the Vatican to cover losses. He allegedly told associates in the Holy See that unless Ambrosiano was protected, he would expose powerful men in Italian finance and politics. Calvi disappeared the day after those frantic phone calls to the Vatican, along with the briefcase packed with sensitive documents.

Leading the effort to solve the mystery of Roberto Calvi's murder has been Carlo Calvi, the banker's son who left Italy in 1977 and now lives in Montreal, Canada.

His father, says Carlo Calvi, "was a dynamic businessman but not a good judge of people."

Police and prosecutors zeroed in on four suspects now on trial: Flavio Carboni; his former girlfriend Antonio Giuffee; and Pippo Calo and Ernesto Diotallevi, two "fixers" with close ties to the Mafia.

There are concerns, though, that the four could be scapegoats for a wider conspiracy, and that significant aspects of the case implicating the Vatican, government agencies, other banks and special interests could be conveniently ignored. The judge in the current proceedings, Mario D'Andra, has been vehement in demanding a swift trial.

"Let's try to keep in mind that this is a trial about facts that happened almost 24 years ago," he declared. And Carboni's attorney, Renato Borzone has argued that there is no proof of his client's participation in any murder, charging Italian prosecutors with "relying on a phony testimony by turncoats" in order to make their case.

On the opening day of the proceedings, Borzone told the court, "Today, a new battle begins to find the truth about Calvi's death.

Carlo Calvi theorizes that while mobsters may have executed his father, "the murder was organized by politicians. The Mafia had simply the role of carrying out the murder."

Questions linger not only about who killed Roberto Calvi, but who ordered the murder.